Repetition and Difference

Updates:
- September 10th

In response to some good questioning in the comments of the last post, I thought I would attempt to focus on some of the arguments Deleuze gives for his position on various issues. In particular, I'd like to focus this post around some introductory remarks on difference and repetition as conceived by Deleuze. The main perspectives which he hopes to move away from (in specific relation to these two aspects) is the view that conceives of difference as the negation of an identity that is primary (e.g. as a difference from some thing, or between two things), and the view which thinks repetition as a repetition of the same. Insofar as these views dominate our common sense understanding of difference and repetition, his endeavour is necessarily counter-intuitive. That being said, common sense is also one of the main targets of Difference & Repetition (albeit a technical meaning of common sense).

The introduction to that major work begins by claiming a distinction between repetition and generality - generality being composed of qualitative resemblances and quantitative equivalences. So for example, we oftentimes state that an object is repeated when we see it once and then again at a later point in time. This judgment is grounded upon a minimal similarity between the prior and the present object - nothing has occurred to it to drastically change its qualities or spatial nature. Deleuze however, points out that strictly speaking what we tend to call repetition is in fact merely generality - a quality and/or extension never repeats itself exactly the same because it is occupying a different spatiotemporal position, and more importantly because it connects with the actual and virtual in a necessarily different way than before (this latter idea depends on seeing objects as ultimately indistinguishable from their environment - which seems to me utterly plausible; this in turn problematizes the idea of an 'object' repeating in the midst of different contexts; instead the object itself is continually being forced to re-negotiate its boundaries with its environment). To sum up this point in other words: in every 'bare repetition' of the same, there is difference. This thought will eventually be developed into the doctrine of the eternal return which argues that what eternally returns (what repeats) is not the same, but difference itself. Leaving that aside for the moment though, we can see that repetition (as commonly understood) is far from being an objective fact - rather, it is an act of our mind (more specifically, the passive syntheses of habit) that takes what is different and represents it as being a repetition of the same. Our every experience of an object understood according to its similarities with other objects is possible only on the condition that there be a background of difference from which this similarity is produced. What we tend to call repetition is far from being a fact of reality; it is only a convention that leads us to call predominantly similar objects repetitions. To put it another way, in the field of representation, similarities dominate; in the field of ontology, differences dominate.

So if repetition is not repetition of the same, then what is this difference that is repeated? It can't be the usual notion of difference (i.e. as the negation of an identity) because that would be to reinstate a repetition of the same. It would entail taking this difference in question and making its existence depend on a prior identity - an identity that would itself be posited as outside the circuit of repeated difference, a transcendent, otherworldly identity. Instead Deleuze argues for an alternative formulation of difference, one he variously calls difference-in-itself, pure difference, or intensity, to replace the traditional concept. Having only defined this idea in negative terms so far though, and insofar as it resists identification, the possibility arises that this is a purely mystical and speculative idea. The short answer to this concern is that he determines the existence of these pure differences by using the transcendental argument form - i.e. by asking what conditions are required for an experience to appear as it does? (This point is brought out nicely in James Williams' guide to Difference and Repetition, to which this post is indebted.) The long answer that fills in the specifics of this form will require a more thorough understanding of the entire Deleuzian system. Obviously that can't easily be fit into a blog post, but the aim is to at least approach such an understanding.

A first approximation can note that if difference has always been conceived as the negation of some ontologically and temporally prior identity, then an idea of pure difference would require that one affirm difference itself and avoid the negative mediating step altogether. In this sense then, we could say that difference has never been given a positive definition, instead having always relied on something outside of itself. A second aspect to note is that for Deleuze, this pure difference is a non-conceptual difference - this follows in part from the earlier discussion of repetition, since a repetition of the same is unable to conceptually differentiate between the two objects; their difference is outside of their concept. More generally, pure difference can be viewed as the intuitive, pre-conceptual experience of reality. Against Kant's idealism, Deleuze is not looking for the transcendental conditions of a representation that is necessarily silent on existence; rather he is searching for the real conditions of an existent singularity (this does entail that he needs an account of how pure differences generate representational thought, but I will save that for another time). Now one could argue that by adding predicates to these concepts we could sufficiently differentiate between them so as to reach their singularity (in a manner akin to Leibniz's monads) - in this way, our usual concepts could fulfill the task of grasping pure difference. Alternatively, we could follow Hegel's criticism and declare our sense certainty of the present moment to be empty - trying to comprehend the singularity of being, we are instead left with the tautology "being is", or we are reduced to spouting off a stream of empty indexicals such as "this object here". Against Leibniz's idea, Deleuze will argue that while it is an admirable attempt at an infinite representation (one that encompasses every infinitely small deviation), it nevertheless returns difference to identity by ultimately relying on a notion of infinitesimal difference that is significant only in relation to the infinite identity of a monad. Against Hegel's denunciation of sense certainty, Deleuze argues that an empirical singularity is far from being indeterminate and empty - there is no such thing as a simple, unanalyzable given, because the given is always a product of an entire history (this genesis being understood not conceptually according to actual causal relations between atomic objects, but in terms of pure difference, e.g. in terms of continuous multiplicities co-existing and interacting to generate singular moments).

In a more general argument, Deleuze also points out what he calls 'conceptual blockages', which restrict the concept from attaining real individuals. These points go beyond the mere limitation of a concept for pragmatic purposes (an artificial blockage), and cut to fundamental reasons against a conceptual understanding of pure difference (a natural blockage). The first target is what he terms 'nominal concepts', which refers simply to the definition of a particular word. These words rely on defining their object with a finite amount of words, which limits their extension, but obviously fails to attain individual existence. The second example refers to 'concepts of nature'. Their comprehension is indefinite which means that they have a finite number of predicates, but this can in principle be extended to infinity. It is important here to distinguish this from an actually infinite comprehension, which would be capable of grasping a truly singular experience. By contrast, the (infinite) pursuit of this actual infinity will always be subject to non-conceptual differences such as within space and time (which can be conceptualized but are not themselves concepts). There will always be a gap between the indefinitely large concept, and its actual singular expression. Finally, while the second example focused on theoretical concepts, the third example highlights concepts derived from our experience. Do we not have a perfect conceptual understanding of something we have sensed merely by virtue of having already experienced its singular nature? No, says Deleuze, precisely because the memory of an object is always distorted (to greater or lesser degrees) by the fact that it is a memory, and not the original event. A particularly acute and recent example of this phenomenon is a poll that found 30% of Americans couldn't remember which year 9/11 occurred in! Beyond that specific case though, our conscious experience of an event will always instill both conscious and unconscious elements, which are then added to and subtracted from when we recall the experience. Our memory of an event is always different from the original experience. For all the above reasons (and a number of others), a conceptual understanding of singular experiences must be denied, although as mentioned earlier this hardly renders them indeterminate. Pure difference, and by extension the entire virtual continuum, is therefore an attempt to think through this non-conceptual, real difference that underlies our usual conceptual understanding of the world.

[Update: September 10th]
While it's perhaps already clear from the preceding, it's nonetheless worthwhile to highlight that the notions of difference and repetition that are being critiqued share the common feature of being based on identity. Thus, difference is the negation of identity, and repetition is the identity of different moments (which only functions provided one implicitly assumes that time is homogenous). Rather than assume an ontological unity that is provided by some transcendent source though, Deleuze (and Badiou following him) place difference, multiplicity and the multiple at the foundations of ontology. For those so inclined, Levi has a good post on the topic of unity and multiplicity, which includes this quote from Badiou about the problems of being as one:

"Since its Parmenidean organization, ontology has built the portico of its ruined temple out of the following experience: what presents itself is essentially multiple; what presents itself is essentially one. The reciprocity of the one and being is certainly the inaugural axiom of philosophy-- Leibniz's formulation is excellent; 'What is not a being is not a being'-- yet it is also its impasse; an impasse in which the revolving door of Plato's Parmenides introduces us to the singular joy of never seeing the moment of conclusion arrive. For if being is one, then one must posit that what is not one, the multiple, is not. But this is unacceptable for thought, because what is presented is multiple and one cannot see how there could be an access to being outside all presentation. If presentation is not, does it still make sense to designate what presents (itself) as being? On the other hand, if presentation is, then the multiple necessarily is. It follows that being is no longer reciprocal with the one and thus it is no longer necessary to consider as one what presents itself, inasmuch as it is. This conclusion is equally unacceptable to thought because presentation is only this multiple inasmuch as what it presents can be counted as one; and so on." (Being & Event, 23)