The Futility of the Israel-Gaza War

For anyone wondering about the status of Deleuzian philosophy and the IDF in the current Gaza war, a fascinating New York Times article basically puts it to rest:

"To avoid booby traps, the Israelis say, they enter buildings by breaking through side walls, rather than going in the front. Once inside, they move from room to room, battering holes in interior walls to avoid exposure to snipers and suicide bombers dressed as civilians, with explosive belts hidden beneath winter coats."

These are, of course, some of the same tactics that Eyal Weizman highlighted in his Hollow Land, showing how the stratified architecture of the urban landscape becomes hollowed out. It is the use of the nomadism of the war machine - but a war machine that is, crucially, tied to a State apparatus.

And further on in the NYT article, comes this interesting and rather surprising fact:

"Israeli intelligence officers are telephoning Gazans and, in good Arabic, pretending to be sympathetic Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians or Libyans, Gazans say and Israel has confirmed. After expressing horror at the Israeli war and asking about the family, the callers ask about local conditions, whether the family supports Hamas and if there are fighters in the building or the neighborhood."

The intriguing/confusing part, however, is that for all the subtlety and intelligence of the tactics outlined in the NYT article (e.g. tiny bombs designed to be pinpoint accurate and minimize collateral damage), the war as a whole has been heavy-handed, rejecting any counterinsurgency emphasis on gaining the support of the civilian population. While it took the US a number of years to figure it out, under the leadership of Petraeus (along with people like John Nagl and bloggers like Abu Muqawama and the Small Wars Journal Blog), they've now begun to make a consistent turn towards counterinsurgency tactics that focus on attaining sustainable peace. These have meant moving away from a sole emphasis on military power, to a recognition of the need for things like the reconstruction of infrastructure, the pacifying of ethnic tensions, the support of the civilian population, the raising of standards of living, and the singular nature of each conflict situation. (Something Petraeus has been explicit in emphasizing against those who believe Iraq's tactics are simply transferable to Afghanistan.)

But whereas counterinsurgency sees the support of the population as one of the key tactics in winning a war, Israel has consistently operated contrary to these principles. The destruction of a UN school, along with 43 civilians who were hiding inside; the killing of 50 new police graduates (importantly, who weren't tied to Hamas); and the apparently intentional attack on a house filled with refugees - refugees Israel had told to go there! - are all blunt instruments in a war that demands nuance to gain any strategic success. (I'll leave aside whether some of these attacks have been war crimes. I'm not an international law scholar, so I'll leave it to the experts.) The question is: why is Israel using these tactics? The IDF is clearly an intelligent body, and they are extremely well-versed in urban combat (I believe they may be the best trained in the world?) - all of which is apparent in the NYT article, as well as in the sophistication of the public relations war they have been carrying on (e.g. the use of Twitter and other new media, the blocking of cell phone transmissions from Gaza, as well as the refusal to let media or NGOs in). Yet they seemed to have learned nothing from the US's quagmire in Iraq, and, indeed, seemed to have learned nothing substantial from the 2006 Lebanon war. The recent UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire was rejected by both sides - despite offering Israel a viable exit strategy, at a time when most of their military goals had already been met (e.g. tunnels from Egypt destroyed, Hamas' leadership greatly incapacitated, rocket fire capacity limited). The Lebanon war, it will be recalled, was going relatively well for Israel until they stayed too long and international opinion turned against them, as well as beginning to suffer significant casualties. I'm not sure why Israel feels compelled to continue this war even now - what goals are left for them to reach?

But this question really strikes at the main problem with the war. I have not seen, in any commentary I've read (liberal, conservative, Marxist, neoconservative), a justifiable rationale for this war. (In fact, the Israeli Ambassador to the US even says as much!) This war will not destroy Hamas (if anything, it has given them much more international support, despite the loss of physical capabilities), and it will not stop the rocket fire (although it would be surprisingly nice if a ceasefire held, and spurned a significant attempt to reach a lasting peace agreement). [1] It may act as a deterrent for rocket fire in the short-term, but in the long term, the Palestinian people will look at Hamas' middle ground between Fatah and the more radical groups, as unsustainable. When the political avenue has gained nothing (the border crossings remained closed throughout the ceasefire, the settlements continue to be constructed unabated, and now the Palestinian people are being collectively punished), many Palestinians are likely to look to more radical and militant organizations. This isn't even a controversial point - attacking Gaza (and not just Hamas) is only going to lead more Palestinians into violent paths. This is clearly counter-productive and points to the absolute idiocy of the neoconservative position.

There are, of course, domestic reasons for the war (Livni hoping to show her hawkish credentials in order to win the upcoming Israeli elections), as well as foreign reasons for the timing (prior to Obama's inauguration, who is less likely to give unconditional support for Israeli military operations). But both of these are short-term benefits to the war, and, if anything, only show the myopic focus of the relevant actors. This is why regional and international guidance is required for any peace negotiations, as Hamas and much of the Israeli government are too tied to the incentives of a never-ending cycle of violence to ever be able to step out of it. (Hezbullah is another good example, as they have been unwilling to cede any military power to the Lebanese government.) With any luck (although I don't hold much hope), Obama will make the eventual cessation of this war as a sign that significant and early progress needs to be made on the Israel/Palestine situation.

[1] In a recent UNRWA panel on Gaza that I attended, one of the presenters noted that he had heard from high-level Israeli sources that it was likely that Israel would implement a unilateral ceasefire within a few days. While I find it unlikely that Hamas (or other groups) will respond in-kind with their own ceasefire, this effort should be pushed. Despite their justifiable anger at the attacks on Gaza, the Palestinian people should take this moment as revealing the urgent and necessary need for a long-lasting peace agreement. This is an untenable situation on both sides, and in the long-term neither has anything to gain by continuing the cycle of violence.