Some Notes on Ontology and Politics



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[UPDATE: Jon, over at Posthegemony, offers some critiques of this position. And Graham, at Object-Oriented Philosophy supplements my post with his own thoughts. I've also posted some thoughts that expand on this issue over at Speculative Heresy.]

[UPDATE #2: Mark from K-Punk offers up some thoughts as well. As is typical of K-Punk, he articulates my own position in a much more eloquent and stark way: "[speculative realism's] role in this respect [is] simply to scorch the earth, to make uninhabitable the ontological territories which continentalists had colonised with their versions of politics."]

[UPDATE #3: Reid responds with his own Laruellean take (one which differs from mine, showing there's hardly any speculative realist consensus even within a leading figure), and Levi responds to both of us with some illuminating thoughts from the perspective of his own object-oriented philosophy. Alex has a related post up that I find myself in complete agreement with, particularly the evacuation of normativity from ontology.]

It seems to me that one of the most contentious and unremarked upon effects of speculative realism has to do with its attack on a piece of continental dogma – namely the presupposition that ontology is necessarily political. This idea is seen in any number of continental works, from Deleuze’s constructivism, to Derrida’s deconstructions of presence, to the social constructivists, gender and identity theorists, among others. The basic idea being that ontology is always constructed through a political battle, a conflict over what exists. In this regards, the contribution of continental work was to undermine the notion that what exists can be definitively determined in an essential way. The problem was that they went too far with this line of thought and tended (I say tended, because there are almost always exceptions) to deny the independence of ontology from politics. In many cases, ontology even became passé, a mere relic of classical philosophy. These ideas, unsurprisingly, came along necessarily with the general acceptance of correlationism – if we can’t speak or know of anything independent of its manifestation to us, then every thing is necessarily already wrapped up in our political relations.

With speculative realism, however, this situation changes. The turn towards objects, towards the absolute, and towards the real as indifferent, all imply that ontology must be independent of politics. We can see this most clearly in Brassier’s work, I believe (although it is implicit in all of them). The relative absence of politics in Nihil Unbound stems partly from the belief that we can study ontology without having to be concerned about its political effects. The results of such a study, as in Brassier’s work, can be rather disconcerting for politics – what if there is no such thing as agency? – but this alone fails to discredit the arguments for such a position. So what does the separation of politics and ontology entail? A few hesitant and suggestive remarks might begin to make clear what precisely is at stake for any speculative realist politics...

The separation entails, first of all, that an ontology cannot be validated in terms of its political effects. Part of Badiou’s greatness is undoubtedly to have rejuvenated the concept of the subject, but when judging his ontology, we have to do so while bracketing these political effects. Similarly, when studying the results of neuroscience and their political implications, we must be careful not to reject them simply because they don't accord with our fundamental beliefs about ourselves. If it turns out that we are no more than patterns of neurons firing, this is a reality whose effective truth holds sway regardless of our political desires. (As an aside, I think that such an idea needs to reject Levi's 'Principle of Irreduction', as there are scientific examples of entities being reduced to other entities. The basic argument against such a principle being that we can be mistaken about how the difference an entity makes, makes that difference.)

The second effect is that we can no longer construct an ontology in order to achieve some political goal. We may wish to privilege difference as a counter to constricting identity formations, but we can not justify this privileging with political arguments. Rather, properly philosophical arguments need to be marshaled in support of these ideas. (This raises the important question of whether philosophy can ever be distinguished from politics completely, but the linguistic intermingling of the two need not entail their necessary correlation outside of language.)

A third and similar point is that an ontology cannot dictate a political program. Difference may be privileged, for example, but this can be taken in the direction of a capitalist individualism or the direction of undermining traditional power relations - a realist ontology will allow for a multitude of political projects to be spawned from it, without necessarily being liberating or progressive (or constraining or conservative).

The fourth effect is a little more radical, I think. This is a renunciation of the tendency among continental theorists to place their political arguments in terms of ontology – I’m thinking here of things like Badiou and the uncounted, Rancière and the people, Deleuze and the minor, etc. The common thread being that the collective agency for political change is always determined in terms of its ontological status – what is inexistent, or uncounted, or unactualized. But political change need not require that something fundamentally new come into being. There can be real political progress made without having to generate ontological novelty. (I’ll also mention too that the faith in the New tends to be another continental political dogma. As though the New was necessarily progressive. While the New may be considered an ontological category, its political content is entirely underdetermined by ontological reasoning.)

The fifth effect is a question of action. It’s the question of the relation between political thought and political action. If ontology is independent of our political projects, at the most basic level there needs to be some account of how one gets effectively translated into the other – how, in other words, does a political program get implemented? Here, what might end up being of crucial use, is Levi’s recent ruminations on what he has called ‘Latour’s principle’ – that there is no transportation without translation. The key here might be in outlining how specifically political projects get translated into specifically political acts with real effects. (Keeping in mind, as Graham has recently emphasized, that the divide between these two is not some paradigmatic relation, but rather only one relation among many. What is required is to underscore the singular relation at any time between a political idea and its concrete implementation - hence the need for continental political theory to be highly knowledgeable about empirical politics.)

Building on that idea, the sixth and last point to make is that the usefulness of ontology for politics would be to come to an understanding of how to leverage effective power. How, that is, to grasp the operations of the independent ontological machine in order to then implement a political project. The study of ontology can show us how causality functions, how ideas are transmitted, how collectivities emerge, etc. - but these in and of themselves have no political leanings. If it turns out that neurology is determining of thought, then political action must be focused on the neurological mechanisms, and not the derivative ideational mechanisms.

Anyways, I’m well aware that these are all pretty underdeveloped thoughts at the moment, but my hope is that they might provide a useful guide for beginning to think through the future of political theory.

The Futility of the Israel-Gaza War



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For anyone wondering about the status of Deleuzian philosophy and the IDF in the current Gaza war, a fascinating New York Times article basically puts it to rest:

"To avoid booby traps, the Israelis say, they enter buildings by breaking through side walls, rather than going in the front. Once inside, they move from room to room, battering holes in interior walls to avoid exposure to snipers and suicide bombers dressed as civilians, with explosive belts hidden beneath winter coats."

These are, of course, some of the same tactics that Eyal Weizman highlighted in his Hollow Land, showing how the stratified architecture of the urban landscape becomes hollowed out. It is the use of the nomadism of the war machine - but a war machine that is, crucially, tied to a State apparatus.

And further on in the NYT article, comes this interesting and rather surprising fact:

"Israeli intelligence officers are telephoning Gazans and, in good Arabic, pretending to be sympathetic Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians or Libyans, Gazans say and Israel has confirmed. After expressing horror at the Israeli war and asking about the family, the callers ask about local conditions, whether the family supports Hamas and if there are fighters in the building or the neighborhood."

The intriguing/confusing part, however, is that for all the subtlety and intelligence of the tactics outlined in the NYT article (e.g. tiny bombs designed to be pinpoint accurate and minimize collateral damage), the war as a whole has been heavy-handed, rejecting any counterinsurgency emphasis on gaining the support of the civilian population. While it took the US a number of years to figure it out, under the leadership of Petraeus (along with people like John Nagl and bloggers like Abu Muqawama and the Small Wars Journal Blog), they've now begun to make a consistent turn towards counterinsurgency tactics that focus on attaining sustainable peace. These have meant moving away from a sole emphasis on military power, to a recognition of the need for things like the reconstruction of infrastructure, the pacifying of ethnic tensions, the support of the civilian population, the raising of standards of living, and the singular nature of each conflict situation. (Something Petraeus has been explicit in emphasizing against those who believe Iraq's tactics are simply transferable to Afghanistan.)

But whereas counterinsurgency sees the support of the population as one of the key tactics in winning a war, Israel has consistently operated contrary to these principles. The destruction of a UN school, along with 43 civilians who were hiding inside; the killing of 50 new police graduates (importantly, who weren't tied to Hamas); and the apparently intentional attack on a house filled with refugees - refugees Israel had told to go there! - are all blunt instruments in a war that demands nuance to gain any strategic success. (I'll leave aside whether some of these attacks have been war crimes. I'm not an international law scholar, so I'll leave it to the experts.) The question is: why is Israel using these tactics? The IDF is clearly an intelligent body, and they are extremely well-versed in urban combat (I believe they may be the best trained in the world?) - all of which is apparent in the NYT article, as well as in the sophistication of the public relations war they have been carrying on (e.g. the use of Twitter and other new media, the blocking of cell phone transmissions from Gaza, as well as the refusal to let media or NGOs in). Yet they seemed to have learned nothing from the US's quagmire in Iraq, and, indeed, seemed to have learned nothing substantial from the 2006 Lebanon war. The recent UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire was rejected by both sides - despite offering Israel a viable exit strategy, at a time when most of their military goals had already been met (e.g. tunnels from Egypt destroyed, Hamas' leadership greatly incapacitated, rocket fire capacity limited). The Lebanon war, it will be recalled, was going relatively well for Israel until they stayed too long and international opinion turned against them, as well as beginning to suffer significant casualties. I'm not sure why Israel feels compelled to continue this war even now - what goals are left for them to reach?

But this question really strikes at the main problem with the war. I have not seen, in any commentary I've read (liberal, conservative, Marxist, neoconservative), a justifiable rationale for this war. (In fact, the Israeli Ambassador to the US even says as much!) This war will not destroy Hamas (if anything, it has given them much more international support, despite the loss of physical capabilities), and it will not stop the rocket fire (although it would be surprisingly nice if a ceasefire held, and spurned a significant attempt to reach a lasting peace agreement). [1] It may act as a deterrent for rocket fire in the short-term, but in the long term, the Palestinian people will look at Hamas' middle ground between Fatah and the more radical groups, as unsustainable. When the political avenue has gained nothing (the border crossings remained closed throughout the ceasefire, the settlements continue to be constructed unabated, and now the Palestinian people are being collectively punished), many Palestinians are likely to look to more radical and militant organizations. This isn't even a controversial point - attacking Gaza (and not just Hamas) is only going to lead more Palestinians into violent paths. This is clearly counter-productive and points to the absolute idiocy of the neoconservative position.

There are, of course, domestic reasons for the war (Livni hoping to show her hawkish credentials in order to win the upcoming Israeli elections), as well as foreign reasons for the timing (prior to Obama's inauguration, who is less likely to give unconditional support for Israeli military operations). But both of these are short-term benefits to the war, and, if anything, only show the myopic focus of the relevant actors. This is why regional and international guidance is required for any peace negotiations, as Hamas and much of the Israeli government are too tied to the incentives of a never-ending cycle of violence to ever be able to step out of it. (Hezbullah is another good example, as they have been unwilling to cede any military power to the Lebanese government.) With any luck (although I don't hold much hope), Obama will make the eventual cessation of this war as a sign that significant and early progress needs to be made on the Israel/Palestine situation.

[1] In a recent UNRWA panel on Gaza that I attended, one of the presenters noted that he had heard from high-level Israeli sources that it was likely that Israel would implement a unilateral ceasefire within a few days. While I find it unlikely that Hamas (or other groups) will respond in-kind with their own ceasefire, this effort should be pushed. Despite their justifiable anger at the attacks on Gaza, the Palestinian people should take this moment as revealing the urgent and necessary need for a long-lasting peace agreement. This is an untenable situation on both sides, and in the long-term neither has anything to gain by continuing the cycle of violence.